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How Kant’s understanding of freedom leads to being obliged to act morally
In our everyday life we face a multitude of moral questions. Often these are not posed explicitly 
but, still, there are many delicate choices to be made: for example, whether or not we ought to be 
truthful to a friend knowing this will make her unhappy or whether we ought to scan all shopping 
goods at the self-service counter in the supermarket although we know that nobody would notice 
our leaving one out. Most of us have a clear opinion on what we think is right and what we think is 
wrong, but what is the ground for that? Questions as those posed in the examples above call for 
principles which guide us to right actions. What kind of principle for morality could there be? And 
if there is one, do we have the freedom to choose to act in accordance to it or is there an obligation 
which confines freedom in this sense? How can we be obliged to act morally? How does this relate 
to our freedom?
In his influential and widely read book  ‘The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’, 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attempts to answer these questions. He tries to establish the supreme 
principle of morality1.  For Kant morality is the normative guideline of conduct that  all rational 
agents should follow. 
Three concepts are of prime importance for his argument: the will, autonomy and freedom. 
Crudely stated,  the  will is  what  causes  our  action,  thus  makes  us  act;  autonomy means  being 
governed by self-imposed laws and freedom has various meanings as we shall see when we move 
on. The two concepts, autonomy and freedom, are a priori propositions, which mean they cannot be 
justified by appealing to experience. For justification, they require a so-called ‘synthetic’2 argument, 
that is, an argument linking the two distinct concepts by using a third term. 
A synthetic  argument  is  opposed to  an  analytic  argument  which  merely works  through 
analysing a concept by what the term entails, for example from the word “ice” it can be derived that 
“ice is solid” by analysing the concept of “ice”. An example for a synthetic argument is the sentence 
“ice  is  floating”,  which  cannot  be  derived  from the  word  “ice”  but  backed up by referring  to 
experience.3 In Kant’s case the concepts – autonomy and freedom – cannot be connected through 
experience since they are a priori, as mentioned above, but the type of argument required is also a 
synthetic one since the concepts are distinct.
In order to pursue the intended justification of (i) the autonomy of the will and (ii) the moral 
demand all imperfectly rational beings experience, Kant introduces the concept of  freedom. From 
the concept of freedom he derives morality. Moreover, freedom leads him to the required third term. 
The moral demand takes the form of the categorical imperative (CI), that is, Kant’s widely known 
principle of morality. 
“Act only  on that maxim through which you could at  the same time will  that it  should  
become a universal law”.  
What exactly he means by these concepts and how he relates them we shall see shortly. 
Before we begin to examine his argument it is worth noting that Kant’s conception of freedom is 
different  from what  is  called  ‘neutral  freedom’4,  that  is,  the  freedom of  choice  whether  to  act 
morally or not. Kant’s conception, as we shall see, does not leave us with this choice.
1 In this article I will refer to the page numbers of H. J. Paton’s The Moral Law;  I will refer to Kant’s text by 
writing ‘Kant’ and to Paton’s commentary by writing ‘Paton’: Kant p. 61
2 Kant p.62
3 Ross
4 Timmermann p. 164
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The negative conception of freedom
In the third chapter of his book Kant begins with the claim that all rational beings have a 
will, that is, a ‘kind of causality’5 since it causes actions6. If I stand in front of a tree and reach out 
for an apple then this interaction, given that it was rational, was initially caused by my will. A will, 
according to Kant, is free in that it is able to work independently from sensuous influences, such as 
inclinations  or desires,  and merely springs from reason. The determination by ‘alien’ causes  in 
general is labelled natural necessity7. Everything in the natural or sensible world is subject to the 
natural laws, that is, the laws of cause and effect. For example, if one moving billard ball – the 
cause – hits another it induces the movement of the second – the effect. Everything that we can 
experience is determined by natural necessity. This is the first conception of freedom: freedom is 
the non-determination of the will by sensuous or ‘alien’ causes. It is a negative conception since it 
states only that the will is not externally determined. From this conception it follows that freedom is 
opposed to natural necessity.
The second and positive conception of freedom
From this point Kant infers that, even though the will is free from natural laws, it must still be 
subject to laws since the will is a ‘kind of causality’ and causality always requires laws. Since if X 
causes Y, there must be a connection governed by laws between X and Y8. Even if X is my will 
which causes me to pursue action Y, there must be a law governing this relationship. The laws 
determining the will must, however, be different from the natural laws because otherwise the will - 
being free from natural necessity - would be self-contradictory. The need for these laws leads Kant 
to the second conception of freedom which is positive. If the will were determined by an ‘alien’ 
cause, it would be a will under  heteronomy, which is Kant’s technical term for the state of being 
caused by something other than itself. Since the will is not determined by any ‘alien’ cause but still 
has to be under laws, it has to be a will under  autonomy, that is, governed by self-imposed laws. 
Freedom therefore implies autonomy. 
The next step in Kant’s argument is contentious and not well-supported. According to Kant, 
autonomy implies acting only on those principles that can at the same time be willed to become a 
universal law, which is one formulation of the CI. 
It is now clear that the will should be under a set of laws, but why should these laws take the 
shape of the CI?  Kant reasons that saying a will is under self-imposed rules means the same as 
saying  that  a  ‘will  […]  is  in  all  actions  a  law  to  itself’9,  which  he  classifies  as  a  modified 
formulation of the CI. Thus, by presupposing and simply analysing this conception of freedom he 
derives  morality in  the form of its  supreme principle.  Morality is  in  this  sense inherent  in the 
concept of freedom. Nevertheless, morality is still a synthetic proposition that is in need of a third 
term, which can be found by using the concept of freedom.
Freedom as property of all rational beings
If morality is to apply to every rational being, freedom must be compellingly ascribed to all rational 
beings. This is impossible by sensuous experience because freedom is an a priori concept, which 
means it is what Kant calls an Idea10: a concept that cannot be proven by empirical means because it 
5 Kant p. 127
6 Kant p. 127
7 Kant p. 125
8 SEP – Kant’s moral philosophy
9 Kant p. 128
10 Paton p. 41
18
does not occur in the natural world. However, freedom can be conceived as the ‘property’ of every 
rational agent. In fact, no rational agent could be conceived as being capable of his own thoughts 
and decisions if he was not free from external determination. Thus, in practical terms, every rational 
agent  with  a  rational  will  can  only  act  on  the  ‘Idea  of  freedom’11,  that  is,  assuming  non-
determination and the will as a ‘first cause’.
The vicious circle
This leads to a problem: having argued that the freedom of the will  implies autonomy - which 
means self-regulation - and thus being under moral laws, Kant argues in turn that freedom has to be 
presupposed because otherwise autonomy would not be possible. This appears to be a vicious circle 
since one concept cannot be used to justify the other if they are reciprocals.
The two standpoints
This is solved by Kant though appealing to his metaphysics. All things can be viewed from two 
standpoints. By merely ‘observing’ something – using one’s senses -, a thing is perceived as a mere 
appearance12. Kant calls this the sensible world where the laws of nature apply. In this world one 
billiard ball hits the other which causes the second to move. By contrast, there is a world that is 
‘something more’13  beyond one’s senses. This world can only be conceived by reason and here the 
laws of morality apply. In this world a thing is not a mere appearance but a thing in itself, that is, it 
contains a part that cannot be experienced by our senses. This world Kant calls the  intelligible  
world.
A rational  being  that  is  imperfect  in  the sense that  it  is  influenced by both  reason and 
sensuous inclinations, necessarily has to conceive itself as a member of both worlds. Consequently, 
it is subject to two different kinds of laws. As far as one is under sensuous influence one conceives 
oneself as part of the sensible world, therefore being subject to the laws of nature. However, as far 
as one is rational one conceives oneself as part of the intelligible world - being free from ‘alien’ 
determination - and is thus bound to conceive one’s causality under the ‘Idea of freedom’14, which is 
directly linked to autonomy, which in turn means being under moral laws.
In  conclusion,  rationality  entails  the  ability  to  distinguish  between  the  two  standpoints. 
Acknowledgement  of  membership  of  the  intelligible  world  shapes  one’s  conception  of  one’s 
causality as being free. Consequently, provided that one agrees with his metaphysics, Kant avoids 
being trapped in the vicious circle mentioned above.
11 Kant p. 130
12 Kant p. 133
13 Kant p. 146
14 Kant p. 135
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Why is the categorical imperative binding? - The third conception of freedom
The binding character of morality, that is, the CI, is possible because ‘the intelligible world contains 
the ground of the sensible world and also of its laws’15. It should be noted that Kant is regrettably 
vague in his explanation as to why this assumption is true. However, he seems to reason that the 
will of a rational being ‘ought’16 to conform to the principle of autonomy, although this being is, 
from a different standpoint,  also part  of the sensible world.  This shows the third conception of 
freedom: the capacity to subordinate all  sensuous influences to reason.  This capacity implies a 
necessity of the free will to conform to moral laws.
How does this necessity come about? The necessity or ‘ought’ statement mentioned above is 
an a priori proposition which can only be conceived but not be proven empirically. For a logical 
connection between a subject and a predicate in a synthetic argument a third term is required that 
establishes  the  link.  Thus,  in  order  to  link  the  imperfect  will  of  a  rational  being  to  the  moral 
obligation to act in accordance with the CI a third term is needed of which they are both part. 
A rational being that is free in the third sense conceives of itself as part of the intelligible 
world and thus has a conception of its own will as a solely intelligible will. What is meant by a 
solely intelligible will? To explore this in more detail,  let us think of a person that is perfectly 
rational and is not influenced by any desires or inclinations. This person would naturally act in 
accordance with the laws of morality and the will of that person would be perfect. But humans are 
under the influence of the sensuous world and thus they are only imperfectly rational and possess 
only an imperfect will. However, they are able to conceive of their will as being perfect since they 
are part of the intelligible world. Kant dubs the conception of a perfect will the ‘Idea of the will’17. 
This solely intelligible will – being beyond any sensuous influences – serves as the third term which 
Kant was seeking. It is a supreme condition of the will which we were directed to by the third 
conception of freedom. 
Since, firstly, a rational being that is free in the third sense is capable of subordinating all 
sensuous influences to reason and, secondly, is able to conceive of its own will as being perfect or 
solely intelligible,  the binding character of the the moral law becomes evident: subjectively,  an 
imperfectly rational being perceives the law of morality thus as a categorical imperative, that is, as 
an ‘ought’ statement without exceptions, and the actions that conform to these laws as duties. 
Conclusion
Having examined the question of how Kant relates freedom to morality, we have seen that, 
according  to  Kant,  freedom  –  as  non-determination  by  external  sources  –  is  a  necessary 
presupposition of all rational beings. This leads to the positive conception of freedom as reciprocal 
of the principle of autonomy. As such, a will under freedom is one and the same as a will under the 
CI since a self-governed will is subject to its own laws and these laws can be identified as the CI. 
However, I find this argumentative connection between autonomy and CI questionable. Moreover, 
15 Kant p. 136
16 Kant p. 137
17 Paton p. 43
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  Subject:
  Imperfect Will
  3rd Term:
  ‘Idea of the same will’ 
  = perfect will (led to by freedom)
  Predicate:
  ‘ought’ to act on a maxim 
  that can be willed to become
  a universal law
  (= CI = morality)
freedom – as a conception of the capacity to subordinate inclinations to reason – is the reason as to 
why moral laws are binding. His metaphysics - the two standpoints – play a pivotal role for this 
moral authority of the CI: every rational being that is – necessarily so because it is rational - capable 
of conceiving itself as member of both the intelligible and the sensible world, will conceive the 
moral law as what a ‘pure will’ would aspire and perceives it as an imperative that it ‘ought’ to act 
upon. However, I object to Kant’s metaphysics since such a rigid distinction between reason and 
emotions  it  hardly existent  in  any human being  and therefore  implausible.  This  objection  thus 
questions his argument since it is then trapped in the vicious circle. Despite this objection, Kant 
uses the Idea of freedom to justify both (i) the existence and (ii) the authority to act in accordance 
with morality. Being free in this sense implies the obligation to act morally. 
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